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Abstract: Wireless Sensor Network is a network of large number of nodes with limited power and
computational capabilities. It has the potential of event monitoring in unattended locations where
there is a chance of unauthorized access. The work that is presented here identifies and addresses the
problem of eavesdropping in the exposed environment of the sensor network, which makes it easy
for the adversary to trace the packets to find the originator source node, hence compromising the
contextual privacy. Our scheme provides an enhanced three-level security system for source location
privacy. The base station is at the center of square grid of four quadrants and it is surrounded by a
ring of flooding nodes, which act as a first step in confusing the adversary. The fake node is deployed
in the opposite quadrant of actual source and start reporting base station. The selection of phantom
node using our algorithm in another quadrant provides the third level of confusion. The results show
that Dissemination in Wireless Sensor Networks (DeLP) has reduced the energy utilization by 50%
percent, increased the safety period by 26%, while providing a six times more packet delivery ratio
along with a further 15% decrease in the packet delivery delay as compared to the tree-based scheme.
It also provides 334% more safety period than the phantom routing, while it lags behind in other
parameters due to the simplicity of phantom scheme. This work illustrates the privacy protection of
the source node and the designed procedure may be useful in designing more robust algorithms for
location privacy.
Keywords: wireless sensor network; contextual privacy; source location privacy
1. Introduction
A network is composed of a set of vertices and a set of edges that connect these vertices. The air
interface provides the facility of edges in wireless networks. Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a
network of sensor nodes that are distributed in an ad-hoc manner. The sensors are designed and
programmed to sense some physical phenomenon, process it, and then report it to the Base Station
(BS). The sensors are normally deployed in a vast area and every sensor may not directly communicate
with the base station. The information is conveyed from source node to destination using multi hop
routing [1].
These wireless sensor nodes (motes) are considered as the basic building blocks of a wireless
sensor network and they have very limited resources in terms of memory, communication range, and
computational power. A mote consists of the basic parts: (1) Processing unit; (2) Radio Frequency (RF)
transceiver unit to communicate with outside world; (3) Power source; and, (4) One or more sensors to
detect physical world, as shown in Figure 1.
Sensors 2019, 19, 2050; doi:10.3390/s19092050 www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors
Sensors 2019, 19, 2050 2 of 22Sensors 2019, 19, x 2 of 23 
 
 
Figure 1. Block diagram of a simple Mote. 
1.1. Motivation: 
WSN can be deployed for many applications from military tracking to habitat monitoring of 
animals [2–9]. The un-attended nature of WSN, like the one discussed in the habitat monitoring of 
animals in large geographical areas, always contain a threat to privacy issues. The adversaries can 
easily gain access to the wireless sensor network because of the open architecture of the underlying 
sensor technology [10]. Intelligent Spectrum analyzers, along with antennae, memory, and 
processing devices may be used for eavesdropping in the deployed network and privacy may be 
compromised [11]. Privacy is a guarantee that information that is gathered might be only observed 
or deciphered by the authorized parties. The monitoring application can be misused by the attacker 
to hunt the animals, hence severely affecting the aim of the monitoring application Location privacy 
is not just limited to remote WSN, but also information leakage in the location-based services by 
third party observers [12] and node location privacy in the industrial wireless sensor network [13] is 
also a big threat to privacy issues.  
1.2. Problem Statement: 
Source location privacy (SLP) is an important issue and a lot of research work has been carried 
regarding it. A number of attacks possible on the wireless sensor networks are discussed in [14]. 
There are two types of privacy classes: content-oriented privacy and contextual privacy. Content 
oriented privacy ensures that the contents of the packets are not exposed or modified while 
traversing from source to sink. This privacy can be ensured with sophisticated encryption 
algorithms and is mostly addressed by recent research carried out by technical community [15–17], 
and it is not the scope of this paper. Contextual privacy is concerned with protecting the context 
that is associated with the sensed data in course of measurement and transmission. This may 
endanger the privacy of the asset if the sensor network is deployed for its monitoring. An 
adversary can use packet tracing to find the location of the source node, while the packets are 
being sent from source to sink for asset monitoring. Hence, endangering the asset. These issues are 
discussed in [1–4,6–8,18–23]. Figure 2 show categories that are associated with privacy issues in WSNs. 
Contextual privacy is the main issue of our interest and we presented a novel approach to protect.  
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1.1. Motivation
WSN ca be deployed for many applications from military tracking to habitat monitoring of
animals [2–9]. The un-attended nature of WSN, like the one discussed in the habitat monitoring of
animals in large geographical areas, always contain a threat to privacy issues. The adversaries can
easily gain access to the wireless sensor network because of the open architecture of the underlying
sensor technology [10]. Intelligent Spectrum analyzers, along with antennae, memory, and processing
devices may be used for eavesdropping in the deployed network and privacy may be compromised [11].
Privacy is a guarantee that information that is gathered might be only observed or deciphered by
the authorized parties. The monitoring application can be misused by the attacker to hunt the
animals, hence severely affecting the aim of the monitoring application Location privacy is not just
limited to remote WSN, but also information leakage in the location-based services by third party
observers [12] and node location privacy in the industrial wireless sensor network [13] is also a big
threat to privacy issues.
1.2. Problem Statement
Source location privacy (SLP) is an important issue and a lot of research work has been carried
regarding it. A number of attacks possible on the wireless sensor networks are discussed in [14].
There are two types of privacy classes: content-oriented privacy and contextual privacy. Content
oriented privacy ensures that the contents of the packets are not exposed or modified while traversing
from source to sink. This privacy can be ensured with sophisticated encryption algorithms and is
mostly addressed by recent research carried out by technical community [15–17], and it is not the scope
of this paper. Contextual privacy is concerned with protecting the context that is associated with the
sensed data in course of measurement and transmission. This may endanger the privacy of the asset if
the sensor network is deployed for its monitoring. An adversary can use packet tracing to find the
location of the source node, while the packets are being sent from source to sink for asset monitoring.
Hence, endangering the asset. These issues are discussed in [1–4,6–8,18–23]. Figure 2 show categories
that are associated with privacy issues in WSNs. Contextual privacy is the main issue of our interest
and we presented a novel approach to protect.
Sensors 2019, 19, 2050 3 of 22
Sensors 2019, 19, x 3 of 23 
 
 
Figure 2. Privacy categories in wireless sensor networks. 
1.3. Contribution: 
Although a lot of work has been done in the area of source location privacy, but there still is 
significant space for quality work to further enhance the SLP. We can summarize the novelties in our 
work, as follows.  
We have proposed a scheme for source location privacy, for which we have assumed a WSN 
arranged in square grid having four quadrants with BS in the center of grid. We further assumed 
that all of the nodes know their relative location from BS in the WSN. When a node wants to report 
activity to the BS, it became source node. BS selects a fake source and a phantom source based on the 
location information of source node and the selection method is explained in Algorithm 1. Similarly, 
a circular zone, called the blast ring [20], around the BS contain nodes specialized for doing flooding 
inside the ring. The ring radius can be increased or decreased, depending on the situation. The nodes 
inside the blast ring are known as blast nodes. The terminology blast ring and flooding ring is 
interchangeably used throughout this text. The blast nodes on the edge of the ring, when it receives a 
packet to be delivered to BS, start flooding in a controlled manner. Flooding is done inside the ring 
within its diameter until the BS receives the packet. BS is single point where all of the sensing data 
accumulates and provides an easy point for back tracing the incoming packets path for source 
location identification. The concept of blast ring is used here to create hurdles for adversary by 
tracing back the packets from a single point (BS). Our proposed technique provides three levels of 
confusion to adversary, from tracing back the packets. First of all, a fake node is nominated, which 
sends packets toward BS. Secondly, phantom node is selected, which sends the packets to BS after it 
receive them from a random path from source node. The third level of the inclusion of blast ring that 
prevents back tracing from single point and adversary having to walk around the ring for tracing the 
path of incoming packets. Increasing the diameter of the blast ring increases the confusion for 
adversary, but the energy consumption also increases due to a widening of area containing 
flooding nodes. This is because, major source of energy consumptions are radio frequency 
transceivers [24–26]. All of these steps made it very hard for the outsider to find the source location.  
The key contributions of our work can be summarized as: 
Our proposed scheme has increased the safety period by 334% from the famous phantom 
routing and approx. 26% of the tree-based scheme [27]. The delivery ratio of the Dissemination in 
Wireless Sensor Networks (DeLP) is improved by approx. 26% from the tree-based scheme. DeLP 
utilizes 50% less energy utilization along with a reduction of delivery miss ratio of approx. 15 % as 
compared to the tree-based scheme. All of these factors show that our scheme performs better in all 
respects than the existing scheme. 
The rest of the paper is organized, as follows: Section 2 describes different models. Section 3 
discusses the related work. Section 4 describes our proposed work. The results are presented in Section 
5. The analysis and evaluation are presented in Section 6, followed by conclusion and future work. 
Figure 2. Privacy categories in wireless sensor networks.
1.3. Contribution
Although a lot of work has been done in the area of source location privacy, but there still is
significant space for quality work to further enhance the SLP. We can summarize the novelties in our
work, as follows.
We have proposed a scheme for source location privacy, for which we have assumed a WSN
arranged in square grid having four quadrants with BS in the center of grid. We further assumed that
all of the nodes know their relative location from BS in the WSN. When a node wants to report activity
to the BS, it became source node. BS selects a fake source and a phantom source based on the location
information of source node and the selection method is explained in Algorithm 1. Similarly, a circular
zone, called the blast ring [20], around the BS contain nodes specialized for doing flooding inside the
ring. The ring radius can be increased or decreased, depending on the situation. The nodes inside the
blast ring are known as blast nodes. The terminology blast ring and flooding ring is interchangeably
used throughout this text. The blast nodes on the edge of the ring, when it receives a packet to be
delivered to BS, start flooding in a controlled manner. Flooding is done inside the ring within its
diameter until the BS receives the packet. BS is single point where all of the sensing data accumulates
and provides an easy point for back tracing the incoming packets path for source location identification.
The concept of blast ring is used here to create hurdles for adversary by tracing back the packets from a
single point (BS). Our proposed technique provides three levels of confusion to adversary, from tracing
back the packets. First of all, a fake node is nominated, which sends packets toward BS. Secondly,
phantom node is selected, which sends the packets to BS after it receive them from a random path from
source node. The third level of the inclusion of blast ring that prevents back tracing from single point
and adversary having to walk around the ring for tracing the path of incoming packets. Increasing
the diameter of the blast ring increases the confusion for adversary, but the energy consumption also
increases due to a widening of area containing flooding nodes. This is because, major source of energy
consumptions are radio frequency transceivers [24–26]. All of these steps made it very hard for the
outsider to find the source location.
The key contributions of our work can be summarized as:
Our proposed scheme has increased the safety period by 334% from the famous phantom routing
and approx. 26% of the tree-based scheme [27]. The delivery ratio of the Dissemination in Wireless
Sensor Networks (DeLP) is improved by approx. 26% from the tree-based scheme. DeLP utilizes 50%
less energy utilization along with a reduction of delivery miss ratio of approx. 15 % as compared to the
tree-based scheme. All of these factors show that our scheme performs better in all respects than the
existing scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized, as follows: Section 2 describes different models. Section 3
discusses the related work. Section 4 describes our proposed work. The results are presented in
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Section 5. The analysis and evaluation are presented in Section 6, followed by conclusion and
future work.
2. Models
2.1. Panda Hunter Game Model
In this paper, the famous panda hunter game model [3] is considered, as shown in Figure 3.
This model is adopted for the WSN and deployed for the habitat monitoring of pandas. As soon as a
node detects a panda, it became source node and keeps on periodically sending the observation via
multi-hop routing techniques. The hunter uses the same network for finding the location of panda by
using the necessary equipment for traffic analysis. The adversary captures a packet and backtrack the
route to reach the originating node to capture the panda. It is assumed that the source node periodically
sends the data with encrypted identity and the adversary cannot decrypt the message to find the
information about source, but the message backtracking facility is used to reach the source node.
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2.2. Adversary Model 
The adversary is an illegal attacker that is equipped with sufficient energy resource along with 
memory and computational capabilities. The adversary is mobile and is well equipped with GPS, 
spectrum analyzer, and antenna. The adversary normally starts from the BS and, upon detecting a 
packet, calculates the angle or arrival to reach the immediate sender node. While waiting at a node, 
the attacker starts a timer and waits to receive a new packet. The attacker also records the current 
sensor node in the memory to overcome looping. The attacker moves to next node on receiving the 
packet before the expiry of the timer and calculating angle or arrival. In this way, he uses the 
backtracking technique to reach the source node. During back tracking at a certain node, if the 
attacker is not able to hear a new message and the timer is expired, the attacker needs to roll back to 
the previous node and delete the previous node from memory. The sensing radius of the attacker is 
assumed to be equal to the transmission radius of a sensor node. The attacker is supposed to be 
passive, which means that the attacker cannot provide any harm to the sensor nodes in the network. 
Algorithm 1 explains the strategy of the attacker. Table 1 summarizes the notations and symbols that 
are used throughout this paper.  
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2.2. Adversary Model
The adversary is an illegal attacker that is equipped with sufficient energy resource along with
memory and computational capabilities. The adversary is mobile and is well equipped with GPS,
spectrum analyzer, and antenna. The adversary normally starts from the BS and, upon detecting a
packet, calculates the angle or arrival to reach the immediate sender node. While waiting at a node, the
attacker starts a timer and waits to receive a new packet. The attacker also records the current sensor
node in the memory to overcome looping. The attacker moves to next node on receiving the packet
before the expiry of the timer and calculating angle or arrival. In this way, he uses the backtracking
technique to reach the source node. During back tracking at a certain node, if the attacker is not able
to hear a new message and the timer is expired, the attacker needs to roll back to the previous node
and delete the previous node from memory. The sensing radius of the attacker is assumed to be equal
to the transmission radius of a sensor node. The attacker is supposed to be passive, which means
that the attacker cannot provide any harm to the sensor nodes in the network. Algorithm 1 explains
the strategy of the attacker. Table 1 summarizes the notations and symbols that are used throughout
this paper.
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Table 1. Important notations used in this work.
Notation Meaning
A, (x,y) Geographic area, location inside A
SN Real source node
FS Fake source node
PS Phantom node
BS Base Station
SN Real source node
Æ Adversary
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Algorithm 1 Adversary attack model 
1: Æ starts as BS and start hearing for packets. When it overhears a packet from a node say node B; 
2: Æ move to immediate sender node and sets the timer ON for timeout interval a ; 
3: Æ record new node in the memory to avoid looping (in this case new node is node B) 
4: While (overhearing at ƥ) do 
5: if Æ receives a packet from ŋ AND ѱ < a  
6: → ŋ  
7: record ŋ in the memory  
8: break; 
9: else if Æ does not receives a packet from ŋ AND ѱ >= a   
11: delete ŋ from the memory (remove latest saved node)  
12: break; 
13: else 
14: do nothing; 
15: end if 
16: end while 
2.3. The Network performance Model 
The nodes in WSN are usually dependent on a battery source and the point of interest is 
reducing the network energy consumption to increase the network lifetime. A sensor node 
consumes energy when it is sending messages, receiving messages, idle listening, computing, or 
sensing the physical world. Out of these, sending and receiving the messages consumes most of the 
energy [24,25]. Apart from energy efficiency, other performance parameters for comparison may be 
safety period, throughput, and delivery miss ratio. Obviously, we cannot acquire excellent results of 
all of these performance parameters. One parameter efficiency may be increased on the cost of other. 
For example, if we want to increase the safety period, we need to design an excellent routing 
mechanism, which can result in reduced backtracking. This may also result in decreasing the energy 
efficiency as compared to shortest path routing. This means that we have to compromise few 
parameters to obtain good results for source location privacy.  
Some major terminologies and parameters discussed in this paper are given below. 
 The safety period is the time required by the attacker to backtrack and capture the panda, or in 
other words, the maximum time a panda stay at a source node before moving to another node. 
 Throughput is the measure of total number of packets successfully received at the base station 
 The network lifetime is shown in terms of rounds and it is the total life span of network from 
the establishment to the death of last node.  
 Delivery miss ratio shows the measure of number of packets that are sent by the source node 
but not received by the base station.  
Present node
New node
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2.3. The Network Pe formance Model
The nodes in us all dependent on a battery source and the point of interest i reducing
the network energy consumpti to increase the network lifetime. A sensor node consumes nergy
when it is sending messages, receiving messages, idle list in , c mputing, or ensing the p ysical
world. Out of these, sending and rec iving the messages consum s most of the energy [24,25].
Apart from energy efficiency, other performance para eters for comparison m y be safety period,
throughput, and delivery miss ratio. Obviously, we cannot acquire exc llent results of all of these
performance parameters. One parameter effici nc may be increased on the cost of other. For example,
if we want to increase the safety period, we nee to d sign an excellent routing m chanism, which can
result in reduced backtracking. This may also result in decreasing he nergy efficiency as ompared to
shortest path routing. This means that we have to compromise few parameters to obtain good results
for source location privacy.
Some major terminologies and parameters di cussed in this paper are given belo .
• The safety period is the time required by the tt cker t backtrack and capture panda, or in
other words, aximum ime a panda stay at a source node b fore moving to another node.
• Throughput is the measure of total number of packets successfully received at the base station
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• The network lifetime is shown in terms of rounds and it is the total life span of network from the
establishment to the death of last node.
• Delivery miss ratio shows the measure of number of packets that are sent by the source node but
not received by the base station.
• Total energy consumption is the measure energy consumed by sensor nodes during the lifetime of
the network. It also includes energy consumption during transmissions, receptions, calculations,
overhearing packets, and idle state.
3. Related Work
To address source anonymity in a network, a lot of work has been done in the past. Anonymous
routing is a term that is used to hide the sender identity over the Internet. Better solutions for this
are Chaum’s mixes [26] and onion routing [27]. In Chaum’s scheme, if a node wants to send data to
another node, it is first sent encrypted to a central server, called the anonymizer, which then removes
the source address from the packet and sends it to the destination. In this way the sender remains
anonymous to the receiver.
In Onion, routing encryption on source routing is used, so that the source identifies the entire
routing path from source to sink and the sent messages are encrypted in layers according to the
intermediate nodes on the path. The next hop to send the message is identified by the present node by
decrypting the message while using its own private key. This leads to hide the source identity because
an intermediate node is aware of just immediate sender and receiver node and none of other node on
the path.
Although the above-discussed two schemes are excellent, they cannot be implemented in wireless
sensor networks, firstly because the layers of encryption are not feasible in memory, power, and
processing limited sensor networks. Secondly, hop by hop transmission from source to sink in wireless
senor network environment allows for an easy approach for adversary to perform traffic analysis and
backtracking using spectrum analyzers and related devices. This may lead the adversary to the source
node, because the encryption can secure the contents and cannot secure the contextual privacy of
the network.
Back tracking if single path routing is used compromises source location privacy. Fake packet
injection by the fake sources is proposed in [2]. The fake sources are required to generate the fake
messages that are identical to the real messages and can also be encrypted to lead the adversary to fake
source instead of real one. In [3], the idea of phantom routing is also proposed, in which a directed
random walk phase is used to deliver the message to a phantom source and then single path or flooding
routing may be used to deliver the message to the sink. Accordingly, packet tracking may lead the
adversary to the phantoms source and the real source remains hidden. The limitations of phantom
routing are identified in [18], where it may lead to the pre-termination of random walk phase due to
the inappropriate selection of the random walk direction, and hence a dropdown in the performance
may be observed in certain areas. The solution to the problem is proposed as to divide the neighbor
set in four directions (E, W, N, S). The real source randomly selects one direction from the list for the
random walk phase. However, by encoding the direction vector into the messages, the random walk
is converted into self-adjusting random walk, even if the random walk is blocked in one direction.
The self-adjusting random walk also allows for using a predetermined ratio to determine whether a
random walk phase may be continued or aborted if the two directions are blocked. A random path
might backtrack to itself after some time, so a loop may be formed. It is desired that the loops may
be avoided and extend the path as long as possible to place the phantom source far away from the
real source.
For this reason, Greedy Random Walk (GROW) is proposed for random walk phase in [4]. The idea
of Bloom filter is used to store all of the current neighbors in the forwarding packet. When the next hop
randomly picks up one neighbor, it checks whether the neighbor entry is present in the filter or not. To
decrease the chance of backtracking, each sensor keeps a Bloom filter to store those neighbors that have
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already participated in the forwarding. Each time a sensor forwarding a packet stores the immediate
upstream and downstream nodes. The author admits that the message delivery ratio is longer enough
and the proposed design is somewhat good for small networks, but not realistic for large networks.
Apart from these two, we have also identified other limitations. First, as the proposed design allows
for the adversary to recover significant routing information if the message is captured, the source
location may be compromised. Secondly, the author does not address a situation if a message reached
a node that has neighbors who have already in visited list. For example, Figure 4 clearly shows this
situation to understand that a message from source node reached ultimately to node n4, but the loop
can only be avoided if the random walk phase is terminated at n4 and the shortest path routing phase
starts, but this will bring the phantom source (n4 in this case) near to the real source. This seems to be a
limitation of this scheme.
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Source location privacy through Routing to a Random Intermediate Node (RRIN) and source
location privacy through Angle-Based Multi-Intermediate nodes is proposed in [19]. The sensor nodes
are assumed to have knowledge regarding their relative locations and their adjacent neighboring
nodes. In RRIN, the intermediate node is randomly selected by the source node and should be at
least dmin distance away from the source node to make it difficult for the adversary to obtain real
information regarding source node, as shown in Figure 5. The intermediate node is the last node of
random walk phase after which shortest path routing may be adopted towards sink. The intermediate
node is selected on the basis of relative location of the source node, so as to make it possible to select
the intermediate node as far as possible.
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In source location privacy through Angle-Based Multi–Intermediate Nodes, the source node
preselects the inter ediate nodes before sending the message and information about the intermediate
nodes is stored in the message header before forwarding by the source node. This places a high risk on
the security side, as the adversary may find all of the routing information from a message by staying
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close to the SINK. To handle this issue, it is the previous information regarding the intermediate node
that will be deleted from message header before forwarding a packet by an intermediate node. Source
location privacy through Angle Based and Quadrant based Multi-Intermediate Nodes have been
discussed by the authors and the results show that the adversary could find the last intermediate node,
but cannot find the source node. Since each sensor node has knowledge of its adjacent nodes and may
not have accurate information about an intermediate node multiple hops away from the source. It may
not even exist, so it is assumed that the last node in the routing path adjacent to the intermediate node
will become the intermediate node.
A type of traffic analysis attack in random walk phase is proposed in [28] to find the source
location in a planner shape sensor network with sensors that are uniformly distributed inside the
plane. The monitoring stations (adversary) are assumed to be at the outer boundary of the network.
The network has restricted access to anyone, except the network owner. The monitoring stations
gathered the information of the packets issued by the source that hit the boundary for the first time,
called the exit distribution. An algorithm is used to find the source location using the exit distribution.
The problem that is found in the proposed scheme is that the author totally ignored the idea of fake
sources in the sensor network. The attack can be easily launched by the injection of fake source, having
a high probability of sending messages to the boundary nodes, which may lead the attacker to the fake
sources instead of the real one.
In [6], a realistic model of attacker is considered in a habitat monitoring application of pandas.
The attacker has installed many observation monitoring devices. A hotspot region is a region where
more pandas are found. It is clear that more packets will be generated in the hotspot regions.
The attacker can exploit the hotspot locating attack. The author proposed the cloud-based scheme to
counter the hot-spot locating attack. In the cloud is composed of an irregular pattern of traffic with
fake traffic. The idea is to confuse the attacker by mixing the real traffic with fake traffic, so that the real
source can remain hidden in the fake traffic or cloud. These clouds can be further mixed to increase the
confusion for an attacker. The creation of this much fake traffic can increase energy consumption many
folds. Accordingly, the clouds may only be formed when real data transmission is needed and then
deactivate it accordingly.
In [7], a tree-based routing scheme is proposed for achieving source location privacy. This scheme
produces diversionary routes for misleading the attacker. There is a fake source on each end of the
diversionary route. The idea was to improve the energy efficiency by utilizing the energy in non-hotspot
regions. In this scheme, many paths are created and the packets paths cross themselves, which creates
problems for attacker. The inclusion of many paths and crossover increases the path length for packets,
which introduces packet delays and reduces the packet delivery ratio. Many diversionary routes
involve more nodes in transmission and reception process, so the overall energy consumption of the
network increases many folds when compared to phantom protocol.
The random packet forwarding technique is used in [22] for SLP. For the network model, it uses
the two-dimensional coordinate system. The network consists of four quadrants with the sink placed
in the first quadrant. The sink first broadcasts its location to all nodes. Each node creates two sets
of reference coordinates using the sink and nodes own location. Df is a constant directivity factor
that is present at each node. When a node receives a packet, it generates a random number and
compares that number with the Df. The random number is then compared with the Df and one of the
reference coordinates is selected on the basis of greater or less than the Df. After this, the shortest path
is calculated using routing table and the packet is forwarded to the selected reference coordinate. This
technique utilizes more memory on nodes due to the use of routing tables. Further packet latency
is involved due to the extra processing involved due to routing tables. Energy consumption is also
increased due to the extra hops between source and sink.
From the existing work, we know that, for protecting SLP, we need to add some confusion for the
attacker. This may complicate the routing process of the packets from source to sink. Other nodes,
like fake, phantom, receptor, and intermediate, to name a few, are considered in the literature. To
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increase SLP, the tradeoff of increasing energy consumption also exists. Out of many of the proposed
solutions for energy efficient WSN, few are energy efficient routing, network balancing, considering
residual energy of nodes, and energy efficient cluster head selection. References [29–33] discusses
some techniques for energy efficiency in WSN.
4. The Proposed Work
In this work, we have proposed an enhanced source location-based privacy technique for wireless
sensor network. At the time of network launching, all of the nodes are informed regarding their
relative location from the base station using the network broadcasting [25]. It is assumed that all of the
sensor nodes are evenly distributed in the surveillance area, as shown in Figure 6.
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We have assumed a square grid having four quadrants and a uniform distribution of sensor nodes
with BS at the center of the grid in our proposed technique, as shown in Figure 6. Our algorithm has
four main steps: (i) Network deployment and selection of BLAST ring by BS around itself; (ii) Activity
detection and identification of Source Node (SN); (iii) Selection of Fake Source (FS) by the BS from the
information of SN; and, (iv) Selection of Phantom source (PS) by the BS from the location information
of SN. The flow chart is presented in the Figure 7.
The nodes near the BS are named flooding/BLAST nodes and forward messages to the BS using
flooding. In this way, the BS from many nodes may receive a single message. This can help to increase
the privacy, because the attacker may not be able to back track from the single aggregation point.
The attacker needs to go at the edge of the blast zone/ring for backtracking the packets. For this, he
needs to go around the blast ring for catching a packet hence increases his efforts and time utilization
in attacking. By increasing the diameter of the blast region, the safety period will increase, but the price
to pay is more energy consumption due to more nodes being involved in flooding. Similarly, we can
take example of increasing the diameter of the flooding ring, so that it encompasses the whole network.
Upon activity detection, the packets are flooded in the whole network and for attacker the packets will
be coming from every side. This will restrict the attacker to take correct decision in finding the source
node and location privacy will be ensured. Accordingly, there is a tradeoff between increasing the
privacy and energy consumption.
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4.1. Network Model
Our network model consists of 400 nodes that are uniformly distributed in the sensing area of
about 400 × 400 square meters. The whole sensing area is divided into four quadrants with the base
station in the middle. Each quadrant is assumed to have an equal number of nodes. The nodes are
assumed to be static and each node knows its relative position (x, y) from the base station. The nodes
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are programmed to send messages to the base station on a hop by hop basis. This means that, once a
node detects an event, it starts reporting by using other nodes in the network. All of the nodes have
equal chances to become a source node, but for the sake of clarity we are assuming only one source
node at a time in our model.
In our network, when a node detects an activity, that node became source node. There is no
need of deploying the phantom source and fake source if the source node is inside the flooding ring.
The source node report to the BS using the flooding technique. If the source node is outside the flooding
ring, then again source node does not start reporting directly, but it has to first choose a fake source
and a phantom source to confuse the adversary, and it is discussed in Algorithm 1. The fake source is
selected from the opposite quadrant. Opposite here means that 1 and 3 are opposite and similarly 2
and 4 are opposite. The fake source is selected from the quadrant on the left or right side of the source
node, which depends on the x, y position of the source node and it is selected on the basis to increase
the distance between source node and fake source.
4.2. Importance of Flooding Region in our Technique
The idea of deploying flooding region is very helpful in increasing source location privacy because
of two reasons.
i. Firstly, most of the techniques that are present in the literature provide poor source location
privacy if the source node is present near the BS, because backtracking is easy. However, in our
technique, if the SN is inside the flooding ring, then, due to the flooding technique, if an attacker
is near the BS and wants to backtrack a packet, then it will be almost impossible to reach the
actual destination. This is because the packets are coming from all of the neighboring nodes
and it makes backtracking a tough job.
ii. Secondly, as BS is the region of convergence for all packets, the backtracking is normally done
from BS. However, as BS is surrounded by flooding nodes, it is not possible for the attacker to
start the backtracking from BS, therefore the attacker needs to come out of the flooding area to
continue backtracking. This again safeguards the source node present inside the BLAST region.
If the source node is outside the flooding region, the attacker still needs to search for incoming
packets towards the BS (flooding region) by moving around the boundary of whole flooding
region. This will waste his energy and time, hence providing more safe time for the asset to
move to new location.
4.3. Algorithm for DeLP
Algorithm 2, for selection of fake and phantom source for different scenarios of real source places other
than inside blast ring
1. if source node is in quadrant 1:
Input: source node quadrant x and y position PSN = (x,y)
Output: Fake and Phantom source quadrant along (x,y) position
FS→ Q3 with PFS = (−|x|,−|y|)
If |x| > |y| then
PS→ Q2 with PPS(−x,y) = PSN(|y|,|x|)
Else PS→ Q4 with PPS(x,−y) = PSN(|y|,|x|)
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2. if source node is in quadrant 2:
Input: source node quadrant x and y position
Output: Fake and Phantom source quadrant along (x,y) position
FS→ Q4 with PFS = (+|x|,−|y|)
If |x| > |y| then
PS→ Q1 with PPS(x,y) = PSN(|y|,|x|)
Else PS→ Q3 with PPS(−x,−y) = PSN(|y|,|x|)
3. if source node is in quadrant 3:
Input: source node quadrant x and y position
Output: Fake and Phantom source quadrant along (x,y) position
FS→ Q1 with PFS = (+|x|,+|y|)
If |x| > |y| then
PS→ Q4 with PPS(x,−y) = PSN(|y|,|x|)
Else PS→ Q2 with PPS(−x,y) = PSN(|y|, |x|)
4. if source node is in quadrant 4:
Input: source node quadrant x and y position
Output: Fake and Phantom source quadrant along (x,y) position
FS→ Q2 with PFS = (−|x|,+|y|)
If |x| > |y| then
PS→ Q3 with PPS(−x,−y) = PSN(|y|,|x|)
Else PS→ Q1 with PPS(x,y) = PSN(|y|,|x|)
4.4. Packet Routing
4.4.1. Packet Routing for the Case of Source Node Inside Flooding Ring
There is no need of selecting fake node and phantom node if the source node is selected inside the
blast ring (flooding region). The packets are delivered using simple flooding technique. The source
node sends the packet to its neighbors and neighboring nodes intern broadcast to others. If a node
receives a packet which was already transmitted by that node, it will be dropped immediately.
4.4.2. Packet Routing for the Case of Source Node Inside Flooding Ring
If the source node is identified in a region other than flooding ring then the proposed Algorithm
1 is followed and the selection of FS and PS is mandatory. If panda is detected in a quadrant (e.g.,
quadrant 1), a single message is generated by the source node and sent to the BS. A single message
is impossible to back track, so there is no need to worry about source location detection. The node
that detects reporting activity becomes SN. FS and PS are not selected purely by the random method
because there is a chance that all the three sources or any of the two may be selected in the same
quadrant. This will lead to produce more traffic in one quadrant and the attacker may find it helpful in
searching for SN. Therefore, the selection process involves the algorithm with the aim of producing
enough distance between the sources.
Upon the detection of panda in the first quadrant, the fake source is deputed in opposite quadrant
(third quadrant in this case). The Phantom node is selected in either the second or fourth quadrant,
and it depends on the distance of the source node from the lines separating the quadrants from each
other. The reason behind this is to increase the distance between the source node and phantom node.
This is shown in the following Figure 8 for more clarity.
The signs used in the Figure 8 represents:
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the fake source (FS) is deputed in opposite quadrant (third quadrant with x, y location (−7, −1), only
the signs changed due to change of quadrant) in this case. The Phanto source (PS) is selected in
either the second or fourth quadrant, and it depends on the distance of the source node fro the
lines separating the quadrants from each other, which also produces some level of randomness in the
selection of PS. The quadrant selection of PS is not strict, but it depends on the location of the S ,
so that the ai of increase of distance bet een the source node and phanto node is achieved. If
source node is near to horizontal line (|x| > |y|), as sho n in Figure 8a, the S is near to quadrant 4
ith respect to quadrant 2. ccordingly, the PS is selected in quadrant 2. If the x, y location in the
second quadrant if taken as sa e as S , hich co es to be (−7, 1), the PS beco es near to FS, hich
ay not be a good decision. For this purpose, to keep the location of PS a ay fro FS, the x and y
locations are interchanged, no the location of PS ill be (−1, 7). This leads to keep the three sources
a ay fro each other to create ore hard ork for attacker.
For the case of Figure 8b, the source node is in quadrant 1 with (x, y) values of (1, 7). The location
of the fake source is straight forward third quadrant, with same x, y values and signs of the quadrant
selected, that is x and y both being negative, so the location of fake source is (−1, −7). For phantom
node selection, the x, y values of source node are taken into consideration. As the (x, y) values of
source nodes are (1, 7), the location of the phantom node will be (7, −1). The –ve sign with y, because it
is fourth quadrant, where y is –ve.
In this ay, hen an activity is detected, the activity detecting node beco es S and F is
deployed in the opposite quadrant. The PS deployment is done according to the algorithm, so that all
three sources are away from each other.
4.5. Energy Consuption Model
Table 2 presents the network parameters.
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Table 2. Network Parameters.
Parameter Value
Threshold distance (do) (m) 87
Eelec (nJ/bit) 50
Efs (pJ/bit/m2) 10
Eamp (pJ/bit/m4) 0.0013
Initial energy (J) 0.9
We considered the typical energy consumption model in [5]. Here, the Et is the transmission
energy consumption and is described in Equation (2), while Er is for receiving energy consumption
and it follows Equation (3).
Et = lEelec + lε f sd2, i f d < do (1)
Et = lEelec + lεampd4, i f d > do (2)
Er = lEelec (3)
4.6. Timing Diagram
The timing diagram is explained in this section in order to understand it. When SN has to report an
activity, it sends a single message, called Start_Up_Msg, to the BS. A single packet is almost impossible
to back track and it provides a safe way to inform the BS about the activity initiation. This packet
has information regarding the source ID, its position (x,y), and session initiation information, along
with an acknowledgement request to start the session. The blast nodes receive the Start_Up_Msg and
it is delivered to BS using flooding. The Start_Up_Msg is similar to ordinary messages, but, upon
decryption, the BS knows that this message means that a node has detected some activity and wants
to report and this reporting may be continued for some time (like the pandas may stay longer at the
source node, so the source node has to report regularly). This continued reporting cannot be done on
direct route, as the adversary can easily back track the packets and the chances of locating the source
node increases.
The BS, upon receiving Start_Up_Msg, selects a fake source (FS) in opposite quadrant according
to the algorithm. BS deputes the FS by sending a message, called Start_Dummy, along a request of
acknowledgement. The FS has to send dummy messages to the BS until it receives Stop_Dummy
message from BS. FS has to send the messages on a natural rate as set on other nodes are using
and they are delivered to BS using random walk. The messages from the FS helps to misguide the
attacker. Meanwhile, the BS also needs to select the PS according to algorithm. BS sends phantom node
initialization message to the PS along a request of acknowledgement. BS informs the PS about its role
that it needs to receive the packets from SN and then send it to the BS while using random walk. The
BS, upon receiving acknowledgement from FS and PS, inform SN to start reporting. The reporting is
done via the phantom source. After the SN stops reporting, the BS informs the selected FS to also stop
sending dummy messages (Stop_Dummy) and it also informs the PS about its release from current
communication session.
4.7. DeLP for Attacker
Let us now explain the whole procedure of attacker interested in capturing the source node
(panda). It is clear in Algorithm 2 that, as all network traffic converges to the BS, the adversary takes a
start by backtracking packets from the BS. If there is no activity, there are no messages and adversary
has to wait. As the sensing activity starts the packets from the FS and PS creates flooding in the blast
ring. The adversary upon backtracking realizes that the packets are coming from all nodes. This puts
the first hurdle for him. The only solution for him is to find out the outer boundary of the flooded area
and wait there for incoming packets. Suppose that he found the outer boundary and reached there
after some time, then another problem that he faces is that he has to start from one point and move
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around the outer boundary for any packet detection. Increasing the radius of flooding ring increases
problems for adversary.
Now, we consider that adversary reaches the ring boundary in quadrant 1, as shown in Figure 6.
His spectrum analyzer starts detecting packets. Upon back tracking, the adversary ends up with the
fake source. After this search, he has to returned to ring boundary and start another search.
Suppose that travelling on the ring edge, the adversary reaches quadrant 2 and detected some
packets coming towards BS. The adversary again starts searching but unluckily ends up with
phantom source.
5. Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed technique in MATLAB as depicted in
Figure 9. Our model consists of 400 × 400 m square with the base station in the middle. One hundred
nodes are randomly deployed in the area. The blast ring is set with a radius of 40 m around the base
station, as shown in Figure 10. Table 2 discusses the network parameters.
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The phantom routing is considered as a baseline in our simulations. We have seen that the
phantom routing is mostly used in the literature for comparisons. Phantom routing provides good
energy efficiency and delivery ratio, but is not efficient in providing excellent source location privacy.
In order to achieve a high level of SLP, it is evident from the literature that we have to compromise
energy consumption. This tradeoff is acceptable if we have such WSN applications, where the location
privacy is of highest importance.
We have three main sources in our proposed model: the source node, fake source, and phantom
source. The data fro all of the sources are aggregated towards the base station. The attacker normally
resides near the BS at the start and then use back tracking in order to find out the source node.
Algorithm 1 discusses the backtracking procedure that was used by the attacker.
5.1. Throughput
Fig re 11 compares the delivery ratio of our proposed scheme with phantom routing [3] and
tree-based diversionary routing [7]. The results show an early decay of packet delivery ratio in
tree-based, followed by DeLP and phantom routing. As phantom routing is simple, with no extra
paths, so the delivery ratio performance is good when compared to the other two schemes, but in
return it compromises the safety period. The delivery ratio of the tree-based scheme is worse because
of long routing paths and due to large number of diversionary routes having fake nodes, which results
in the collision of packets. The extra-long paths also introduce delivery latency.
Table 3 shows the comparative analysis of packet delivery ratio. The results show that the delivery
ratio of DeLP has an improvement of more than 600% as compared to the tree-based scheme. The main
reason behind the good delivery ratio of DeLP is that the source node, phantom, and fake node exist in
different quadrants. This reduces the chance of overlapping paths, and hence reducing the chances of
packet collisions. On the other hand, phantom routing shows an improvement of only about 10% in
terms of packet delivery ratio when compared to DeLP. However, this comes with paying a big cost of
compromising source location privacy, where DeLP shows an improvement of more than 300% than
phantom scheme. Hence, for an obtaining such a big increase in SLP of more than 300%, compromising
a 10% in packet delivery ratio is not a big deal. The results indicate that the DeLP outperforms the
tree-based scheme in throughput while providing efficient source location privacy.
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Table 3. Comparison of packet delivery ratio after equal intervals.
S.No Name of Protocol At 1000Rounds
At 2000
Rounds
At 3000
Rounds
At 4 0
Rounds
At 500
Rounds Average
1 Phantom 0.95 0.51 0.32 0.2 0.15 0.426
2 Tree-based Diversionary Routing 0.1 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.054
3 DeLP 0.93 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.15 0.384
5.2. Safety Period
Figure 12 shows the safety period of the analyzed schemes. The results show a lesser safety period
than the tree-based scheme, as the phantom scheme cannot not create enough confusion for adversary.
The tree-based scheme produces many paths and each path ends with a fake source. The safety period
of tree-based scheme is mostly dependent on the number of diversionary paths. As the number of
diversionary paths increases, so does the safety period. However, increasing the number of paths
comes with a great cost of increasing the overall energy consumption of the network.
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Table 4 shows the comparative analysis of safety period. Out of the three schemes, our proposed
scheme shows excellent results outperforming the other two schemes. The results indicate that DeLP
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shows a tremendous increase of safety period approx. 334% more than the phantom routing. It is
also evident that DeLP performs better than the tree-based scheme, by showing 26% more safety
period. This is because the fake packets and real packets are coming from different sides, while the real
source node resides at a different quadrant. In addition, the BS is surrounded by a flooding nodes ring,
which further confuses the attacker. As the attacker near the BS is receiving packets from all sides,
he is considerably confused about which packet to backtrack. Even if he decides to backtrack anyone,
he may end up with either fake or phantom source, which increases the safety period. The performance
of tree-based scheme is also good when compared to the phantom scheme, but is still less than our
proposed scheme.
Table 4. Comparison of safety period after equal intervals.
S.No Name of Protocol At 1000Rounds
At 2000
Rounds
At 3000
Rounds
At 4000
Rounds
At 5000
Rounds Average
1 Phantom 17.35 37.65 41.85 45 47.45 37.86
2 Tree-based Diversionary Routing 66.9 134.8 142.8 149.7 153.5 129.54
3 DeLP 160 162 166 167 168 164.6
As our technique constitutes of three layers of confusion, namely the blast ring, phantom source,
and fake source. The major contribution towards the saftey period is offered by the blast ring, followed
by phantom source, and then fake source. Different experiments revealed that 60% of the saftey period
contribution was made by the blast ring alone. In the remianing 40%, the phantom source contributes
24% alone, while 16% was contributed by the fake souce.
5.3. Energy Consumption
Figure 13 shows the energy consumption of the analyzed schemes. Phantom routing shows less
energy consumption than the other two, but it results in a lesser source location privacy. The energy
consumption is dependent on the path length between source and sink. Optimal results for energy
consumption can be achieved using shortest path routing, but the SLP will be compromised. We need
to compromise energy consumption in order to have a good safety period. This tradeoff is acceptable,
because we need to improve the safety period and need to increase confusion for the attacker.
The increase of energy consumption is worthy in the case of such applications where we need to
monitor valuable assets and safety is of highest importance. In comparison to phantom routing, our
scheme guarantees that the PS will not be deputed in the same quadrant of SN, but in the adjacent
quadrant with the aim to make them far apart to increase the path length. This is one of the factors in
increasing SLP and one of the reasons of more energy consumption than simple phantom routing.
Table 5 shows the comparative analysis of the schemes for energy consumption. As we have
considered phantom routing as a baseline scheme, therefore the other two schemes have higher energy
consumption than this. However, in return, they both provide enhanced SLP than the phantom scheme.
The results show that the energy consumption of DeLP is approx. 50% of that of tree-based routing.
This concludes that DeLP provides about 26% improvement in safety period by consuming 50% less
energy than tree-based routing. This makes our scheme efficient in terms of safety period and energy
efficiency. Tree- based scheme uses many diversionary paths, which increase the overall path length of
the packets, hence resulting in an increase of energy consumption. DeLP also uses long paths and a
flooding ring along fake source, which increases the energy consumption. Tree-based and DeLP shows
an increase of about 4.4 time and 1.7 time more energy consumption than the phantom routing.
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The Tree-based scheme has highest packet miss ratio due to many diversionary paths. These paths 
cross each other, which results in packet collision, hence increasing the miss ratio. DeLP also 
employs a flooding region, which plays a role in packet collision.  
The comparative analysis that is shown in Table 5 shows that, although DeLP provides a 
greater safety period of about 26%, along with a reduction of energy consumption to 50%, still it 
offers 15% lesser delivery miss ratio as compared to tree-based scheme. Due to the reason discussed 
above, the delivery-miss ratio of tree-based scheme and DeLP is approx. 1.9 times and 1.5 times, 
respectively, as compared to phantom routing.  
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S.No Name of Protocol At 1000Rounds
At 2000
Rounds
At 3000
Rounds
At 4000
Rounds
t 50 0
Rounds Average
1 Phantom 1.124 2.12 2.96 3.6 4.16 2.7928
2 Tree-based Diversionary Routing 12.45 14.3 15.55 16.51 17.09 15.18
3 DeLP 4.17 6.45 7.86 9.13 10.09 7.54
5.4. Delivery Miss Ratio
It shows the ratio of number of packets that are sent but not received at BS. Figure 14 shows the
delivery miss ratio of the three schemes. Less confusion in the network results in less packets loss.
The Tree-based scheme has highest packet miss ratio due to many diversionary paths. These paths
cross each other, which results in packet collision, hence increasing the miss ratio. DeLP also employs
a flooding region, which plays a role in packet collision.
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attacker somehow managed to come out of the ring (ring edge), then he has to utilize his energy on 
tracking a big ring for incoming packets instead of tracking back from a single BS. Back tracking 
towards the FS places more hurdles for attacker. Similarly, the last chance of tracking packets 
coming towards blast ring is from phantom source and upon tracking that path the attacker still 
cannot locate the SN. This provides a big safety period for the source and, in the case of a mobile 
target, there is a big chance that the location of the target has already changed.  
Our proposed approach has improved the source location privacy with a very little increase 
in the network traffic or energy consumption as compared to other techniques especially proposed 
in [5–7]. We are neither creating multiple fogs nor creating multiple diversionary paths for the 
adversary’s confusion, which actually increases the traffic and energy consumption. In our scheme, 
we have deputed some specialized nodes inside the blast ring for flooding, but they are not 
significantly contributing towards the increase in the network traffic and energy consumption. 
The overall comparative analysis shows that DeLP proves itself to be an effective scheme in the 
considered performance metrices. DeLP outperforms tree-based scheme in all four performance 
metrices. It provides 26% more safety period, 600 % more throughput, 15% less packet delay and 
50% less energy consumption when compared to the tree-based scheme.  
In our area of research, we are more conscious about securing the location of source node, as it 
can compromise can result in a loss of valuable assets for who is monitoring the network is 
deployed. Routing techniques with the shortest path or techniques that cannot make confusion for 
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In this paper, we presented an enhanced scheme for source location privacy, which provides 
three levels of security. After network deployment, the BS selects a ring of flooding nodes around 
itself. This flooding ring helps in confusing the eavesdropper, as the packets are converging towards 
the BS from all sides due to flooding. This reduces the capability of attacker to directly backtrack the 
packets from the BS and he needs to go around the whole flooding ring for backtracking. Similarly, 
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The comparative analysis that is shown in Table 5 shows that, although DeLP provides a greater
safety period of about 26%, along with a reduction of energy consumption to 50%, still it offers 15%
lesser delivery miss ratio as compared to tree-based scheme. Due to the reason discussed above, the
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delivery-miss ratio of tree-based scheme and DeLP is approx. 1.9 times and 1.5 times, respectively,
as compared to phantom routing.
6. Analysis and Evaluation
Our proposed technique provides three levels of security to the source nodes. First of all,
the advantage of blast ring is that it confuses the attacker in a flooded environment. Secondly, if the
attacker somehow managed to come out of the ring (ring edge), then he has to utilize his energy on
tracking a big ring for incoming packets instead of tracking back from a single BS. Back tracking
towards the FS places more hurdles for attacker. Similarly, the last chance of tracking packets coming
towards blast ring is from phantom source and upon tracking that path the attacker still cannot locate
the SN. This provides a big safety period for the source and, in the case of a mobile target, there is a big
chance that the location of the target has already changed.
Our proposed approach has improved the source location privacy with a very little increase in the
network traffic or energy consumption as compared to other techniques especially proposed in [5–7].
We are neither creating multiple fogs nor creating multiple diversionary paths for the adversary’s
confusion, which actually increases the traffic and energy consumption. In our scheme, we have
deputed some specialized nodes inside the blast ring for flooding, but they are not significantly
contributing towards the increase in the network traffic and energy consumption.
The overall comparative analysis shows that DeLP proves itself to be an effective scheme in
the considered performance metrices. DeLP outperforms tree-based scheme in all four performance
metrices. It provides 26% more safety period, 600 % more throughput, 15% less packet delay and 50%
less energy consumption when compared to the tree-based scheme.
In our area of research, we are more conscious about securing the location of source node, as it
can compromise can result in a loss of valuable assets for who is monitoring the network is deployed.
Routing techniques with the shortest path or techniques that cannot make confusion for an attacker
cannot perform well for SLP. Techniques, like phantom routing, are one of the earliest techniques
used for SLP uses simple architecture. This technique performs well as far as energy consumption,
packet delay, and delivery ratio are concerned, but does not provide enough location privacy. The
comparative analysis shows that DeLP provides 334%, while tree-based scheme provides about 242 %
more safety period than phantom routing.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we presented an enhanced scheme for source location privacy, which provides three
levels of security. After network deployment, the BS selects a ring of flooding nodes around itself. This
flooding ring helps in confusing the eavesdropper, as the packets are converging towards the BS from
all sides due to flooding. This reduces the capability of attacker to directly backtrack the packets from
the BS and he needs to go around the whole flooding ring for backtracking. Similarly, the deployment
of fake source is in an opposite quadrant of SN and the phantom source is in one of the adjacent
quadrants. The idea was to increase the distance between the fake and phantom sources with respect
to SN. This guarantees that the traffic is coming from different parts of the network towards the BS to
put hurdles for the attacker in backtracking the SN. Quadrants also help in increasing the safety period.
The results show that our proposed scheme has 50% less energy consumption, 26% more safety period,
15% less packet delivery delay, and six times more packet delivery ratio as compared to the tree-based
scheme. We have also used the phantom scheme for comparison and our scheme provides 334% more
safety period than it. However, it provides less energy consumption and packet delivery delay, and has
more packet delivery ratio than our scheme due to the simplicity of architecture and reduced traffic.
Energy harvesting WSNs is a hot area and being investigated by many researchers to increase
the lifetime of the networks. The main power source of wireless sensor nodes is their battery, so
compelling it to the extra-required communication sessions may quickly drain it. This may cause the
nodes isolation from the network due to the exhaust of its power source and may also result in the
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network. However, it is possible to utilize the solar cells with nodes in the blast ring of our wireless
sensor network to meet the power demands and extend the life of the network [23]. This may cause a
bit of an increase in the size of the wireless nodes due to the implantation of the solar cell. A credit
card size solar cell may help in improving the power issue in areas having more sunny times (small
winter seasons), but the size of the cell will mainly depend on the seasonal exposure of the nodes to
sun. This feature may be very suited for the nodes inside the blast ring as an extra power source. The
installation of credit card size solar cells on wireless nodes (especially nodes inside blast ring) is our
future work to further enhance the network lifetime.
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